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Non-Technical Summary
The study analyses business cycles of the G7 countries in a structural vector auto-
regression (SVAR) framework with common factors. A multitude of studies which inves-
tigate the driving forces of international business cycles distinguish between common and
country-specific shocks, while the identified shocks are not given an economic interpretation.
The main advantage of our approach vis-a`-vis other empirical approaches is that we consider
three types of structural shocks –supply, demand and nominal– that contain (unobserved)
common and country-specific elements. Such a modelling approach is in line with a class
of theoretical international business cycle models that trace international linkages back to
common exogenous shocks.
We first establish that output cycles of the G7 countries have generally been highly
correlated, but a recent increase in the cycle synchronisation is not observed. Nominal
interest rate growth is found to be moderately correlated in the G7 group, and since the
mid-1990s a gradual increase in synchronisation took place. Inflation growth, however, has
always been a rather country-specific phenomenon according to our findings.
In order to assess the similarity of the shock propagation mechanisms in the G7 countries,
we compute correlations that would have been observed if the countries were subject to
common shocks only. We find that we would generally observe much higher correlations
of the cyclical measures if only common shocks occurred or if common shocks had a larger
share in the variance of the cycles. Japan is an exception to this rule.
Common supply shocks are the only important contributor to output fluctuations within
the class of common shocks and the main driving force of synchronisation. Country-specific
nominal shocks contribute to the output cycle variance only in Canada, Italy and the US,
and country-specific demand shocks only in the US. The weights of nominal and demand
shocks are negligible for all other G7 countries. The G7 countries do not differ much in
terms of shock propagation with respect to inflation growth, but they are subject to large
asymmetric shocks. This explains the low correlations of inflation growth in the G7 group.
The total share of common shocks is generally relatively high in the G7 countries’ nominal
interest rate growth, which explains the strong correlation among the G7 countries’ nominal
interest rate growth.
Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Die Studie analysiert Konjunkturzyklen der G7 La¨nder in einem strukturellen vektorautore-
gressiven Modell mit gemeinsamen Faktoren. Eine Vielzahl von Studien, welche die Quellen
von internationalen Konjunkturzyklen untersuchen, unterscheiden zwischen allgemeinen und
la¨nderspezifischen Schocks, wobei identifizierte Schocks nicht o¨konomisch interpretiert wer-
den. Die Besonderheit unseres Ansatzes im Vergleich zu anderen empirischen Arbeiten liegt
darin, dass wir drei Typen von strukturellen Schocks (angebotsseitig, nachfrageseitig und
nominal) beru¨cksichtigen, die (unbeobachtbare) gemeinsame und la¨nderspezifische Elemente
enthalten. Ein solcher Modellierungsansatz steht im Einklang mit einer Klasse von the-
oretischen Konjunkturmodellen, die internationale Verbindungen auf gemeinsame exogene
Schocks zuru¨ckfu¨hren.
Wir stellen fest, dass die Outputzyklen der G7 La¨nder zwar im Allgemeinen stark korre-
liert sind, aber ein neuerlicher Anstieg in der Zyklensynchronisation nicht beobachtet werden
kann. Das Wachstum der Nominalzinssa¨tze ist in der Gruppe der G7 La¨nder ma¨ßig korreliert
und seit Mitte der 90er hat eine allma¨hliche Synchronisation stattgefunden. Allerdings ist die
Entwicklung der Inflation nach unseren Ergebnissen schon immer eher ein la¨nderspezifisches
Pha¨nomen gewesen.
Um die A¨hnlichkeit der Schockfortpflanzungsmechanismen der G7 La¨nder abscha¨tzen
zu ko¨nnen, berechnen wir Korrelationen, die sich ergeben wu¨rden, wenn die La¨nder nur
gemeinsamen Schocks ausgesetzt wa¨ren. Wir finden, dass wir im Allgemeinen viel ho¨here
Korrelationen der konjunkturabha¨ngigen Maße beobachten wu¨rden, wenn nur gemeinsame
Schocks auftreten oder wenn gemeinsame Schocks einen gro¨ßeren Anteil an der Varianz der
Zyklen besitzen. Japan ist eine Ausnahme von dieser Regel.
Gemeinsame Angebotsschocks leisten innerhalb der Klasse der gemeinsamen Schocks als
einzige einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Outputfluktuation und stellen die Hauptantriebskraft der
Synchronisation dar. La¨nderspezifische nominale Schocks tragen nur in Kanada, Italien und
den USA zur Varianz der Outputschwankungen bei und la¨nderspezifische Nachfrageschocks
nur in den USA. Die Bedeutung von nominalen Schocks und Nachfrageschocks ist fu¨r alle
anderen G7 La¨nder vernachla¨ssigbar. Die G7 La¨nder unterscheiden sich nicht wesentlich in
der Dauer der Schockausbreitung bezu¨glich des Inflationswachstums, aber sie sind großen
asymmetrischen Schocks ausgesetzt. Das erkla¨rt die schwache Korrelation des Inflation-
swachstums innerhalb der G7 Gruppe. Der gesamte Anteil gemeinsamer Schocks ist im
Wachstum der nominalen Zinssa¨tze generell fu¨r die G7 La¨nder relativ hoch, was die starke
Korrelation dieser Gro¨ße zwischen den G7 La¨ndern erkla¨rt.
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1. Introduction
This study analyses the business cycles of the G7 countries in a structural vector au-
toregression (SVAR) framework with common factors. Our main interest lies in assessing
the extent to which the business cycle co-movement in the G7 group is driven by structural
common shocks. A multitude of studies, which investigate the driving forces of interna-
tional business cycles, distinguish between common and country-specific shocks, while such
shocks are rarely given an economic intepretation.1 In this study, we identify three types
of structural common and country-specific shocks –supply, demand and nominal– and hence
distinguish between more than common and country-specific shocks only.
We start our investigation by establishing the statistical properties of the G7 countries’
cycles of output, inflation and nominal interest rate. Our main interest lies in inferring
(i) the degree of co-movement of the G7 countries’ cycles and (ii) whether there has been
a change in the co-movement patterns over time. The first question is investigated by
means of the simple correlation coefficient as the measure of co-movement, while the second
question is addressed by computing mean and variance of correlations over 6-year rolling
windows. A higher mean accompanied by a lower standard deviation implies an increase
in business cycle synchronisation among the G7 countries. After establishing the statistical
properties of the G7 countries’ cycles, we decompose the variances of each country’s cycles
with respect to the common and country-specific components of supply, demand and nominal
shocks using our empirical model. We are particularly interested in determining (i) which
structural shocks drive or dampen international cyclical co-movements of output, inflation
and nominal interest rate; (ii) which types of structural shocks drive the cyclical fluctuations
of the individual countries; and (iii) the share of common shocks in cyclical fluctuations.
Many studies investigating the international business cycles in the existing SVAR litera-
ture check the correlation of the estimated structural shocks of different countries in order
to assess the degree of international business cycle synchronisation.2 This approach alone
1Stock and Watson (2005) and Canova et al. (2007) estimate, for example, common shocks and country-
specific shocks with spillover effects within the G7 group. Perez et al. (2006) identify US, EU15 and country-
specific shocks. Crucini et al. (2008) model common G7, nation-specific and idiosyncratic factors. While
following different approaches to identification, none of these studies pursue a structural identification.
Clearly, this list is far from being exhaustive, but can be extented.
2See, among others, Artis (2000), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992), Chamie et al. (1994), Fidrmuc and
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suffers from at least two drawbacks. First, it does not consider the country-specific and
common components of structural shocks explicitly. Second, it ignores the role of the trans-
mission mechanism. Yet, structural shocks constitute only one aspect, while information on
the shock propagation mechanism is also needed for a proper understanding of international
business cycles. Structural shocks of two countries may, for instance, be highly correlated,
but the response of macroeconomic variables to these shocks may differ. Our analysis of
the business cycle dynamics of the G7 countries addresses both of these issues. We com-
pute counterfactual correlations and carry out variance decompositions of each G7 country’s
cycles.
Different approaches have been developed in the macroeconometric literature for es-
timating country-specific and common shocks as well as their propagation.3 We follow
Chamie et al. (1994) and Xu (2006) who first estimate the structural shocks of the individ-
ual countries within a country-specific VAR model of each country in their sample, and then
compute the common and country-specific components of those shocks with the Kalman-
filter technique, whereby the components are modelled as unobservable states. However, we
deviate from the procedure by estimating a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system of
country-specific VAR models for the G7 countries to increase the estimation efficiency and to
address the international linkages. Our country-specific VAR models comprise output, real
interest rate and inflation. The error terms corresponding to these variables are assumed to
be linear combinations of supply, demand and nominal shocks.
There are two extreme situations which can potentially explain a far-from-perfect co-
movement of two countries’ cycles: (i) either both countries are subject to common shocks
only, but their shock propagation mechanisms differ substantially; or (ii) countries exhibit
similar shock propagation, but they are subject to asymmetric shocks only. The reality is
probably somewhere in between. In order to assess the similarity of the shock propagation
mechanisms in the G7 countries, we compute counterfactual correlations –i.e. correlations
Korhonen (2003), Frenkel and Nickel (2005) and Xu (2006).
3We refer the reader to Stock and Watson (2005) for a brief review of some of these approaches, which in-
clude identifying a world (G7) shock in a univariate time series model of the world and estimating parametric
or nonparametric dynamic factor models. Stock and Watson (2005) discuss the strengths and weaknesses of
these approaches and provide a list of studies employing them. Stock and Watson (2005) themselves work
with a factor-structural VAR model for the analysis of international business cycle dynamics.
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that would have been observed if the countries were subject to common shocks only and no
country-specific shocks took place. High counterfactual correlations with respect to common
shocks point to the similarity of dynamic response mechanisms in the G7 countries. The
weight of asymmetric shocks in the cycles of the G7 countries are assessed with variance
decomposition.
The following section presents the econometric methodology used for the analysis of the
properties of business cycles. Section 3 starts with a descriptive analysis of the cycles of the
G7 countries and presents the results of our econometric analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2. Econometric Methodology
Several frameworks have been proposed in macroeconometric studies that investigate in-
ternational business cycles, and two characteristics are common to most of them: they typ-
ically investigate the output cycles and do not attribute the identified shocks an economic
interpretation. Our empirical framework does, however, not bear these characteristics. We
investigate the properties of inflation and nominal interest rate growth in addition to output
cycles and analyse the impact of common and country-specific supply, demand and nomi-
nal shocks for each country. The structural shocks are identified by allowing interactions
among output, real interest rate and inflation growth in each G7 country. Yet, including
more variables as well as estimating structural shocks comes at the cost of restricting direct
interactions among the variables across the G7 countries: countries in our empirical model
are allowed to interact through exogenous shocks only. On the other hand, although our
empirical framework is simple, it is in line with a class of theoretical models as argued below.
Since our approach provides advantages and disadvantages vis-a`-vis other empirical frame-
works, it brings useful insights into the nature of the dynamics of business cycles in the G7
group. We compare our findings with other studies’ findings in our concluding remarks.
Our empirical analysis is based on K-dimensional reduced-form country-specific VARs
given by
∆Xi,t = νi + Ai,1∆Xi,t−1 + · · ·+ Ai,p∆Xi,t−p + ui,t (1)
for country i, where Xi,t is the vector of endogenous variables, ∆ is the difference operator
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such that ∆Xi,t = Xi,t − Xi,t−1, νi is the constant vector, Ai,j is the j
th VAR coefficient
matrix of country i for i = 1, . . . , 7 and j = 1, . . . , p, p is the lag order of the VAR, and
ui,t denote linear combinations of structural innovations. We estimate the VAR coefficient
matrices as well as the innovations within a SUR framework for the G7 countries. Let the
structural moving average representation of (1) be
∆Xi,t = µi + Ci (L) εi,t, (2)
where L is the conventional lag operator, Ci (L) =
∑
∞
j=0 Ci,jL
j, µi is the constant vector,
and ui,t = Bεi,t. εi,t are typically given an economic interpretation through imposition of
some restrictions on the elements of the K ×K matrix B with K2 unknown elements.
2.1. Identification of Structural Shocks
The identification procedure that we employ for determining the matrix B is the one
with long-run restrictions introduced to the macroeconometric literature by Blanchard and
Quah (1989). Each country-specific VAR model comprises the log of output, yi,t, which is
represented here by the real GDP, the real interest rate, Ri,t−pii,t, and the inflation rate, pii,t,
of the corresponding country. Note that such a model includes the nominal interest rate, Ri,t,
indirectly, which is the sum of the real interest rate and the inflation rate by construction.
The dynamic multipliers and the structural shocks contained, respectively, in Ci (L) and
εi,t can be easily computed when the matrix B is identified. In the case of a VAR model
with three variables, the identification ofB follows fromK (K + 1) /2 = 6 restrictions coming
from the assumption of a covariance matrix of εi,t of the form Σε = IK , where IK stands
for the K ×K identity matrix. Furthermore, K (K − 1) /2 = 3 restrictions follow from the
assumption that the structural matrix of the long-run multipliers Ci (1) is lower triangular:
Ci (1) =


ci,11 0 0
ci,21 ci,22 0
ci,31 ci,32 ci,33

 .
Thus, the first shock in this system is called a supply shock in line with the identification
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scheme of Blanchard and Quah (1989), since this is the only shock that can affect the level
of output in the long run. This restriction is consistent with the majority of theoretical
macroeconomic models which imply that output is determined only by supply-side shocks
in the long run. The second shock affects the real interest rate in the long run alongside the
supply shock, but not the output, and is labelled as a demand shock. The idea behind this
restriction is that the demand shock may affect the composition of output in the long run,
but not its level. The motivation for this assumption follows, among others, from the study
of King et al. (1991), whose arguments and empirical findings suggest that long-run changes
in the real interest rate can affect the consumption-output and the investment-output ratios,
but not the level of output. Moreover, a strand of the macroeconomic literature also suggests
that long-run real interest rate movements can be affected by government debt, hence also
by fiscal expenditures, which are also typically seen as demand boosting measures, however,
without a major long-run impact on production possibilities and output. The last shock
is called a nominal shock, which can affect only the nominal variables in the model –the
inflation rate and the nominal interest rate– in the long run, but not the real variables, output
and real interest rate. This restriction is common to theoretical models which investigate
the long run. Such theoretical models do typically not comprise money and prices, since
monetary phenomena should not be relevant for real variables in the long run according to
the standard theory. Note, however, that our model does not restrict the short-run effects
of nominal shocks on the real variables –the output and the real interest rate.
2.2. Estimation of Common and Country-Specific Components
The estimation of the common and country-specific components of the supply, demand
and nominal shocks is conducted as by Chamie et al. (1994). The procedure starts with
estimating a SVAR model for each G7 country as described above. In the second step, the
estimated shocks of all countries are collected in a state-space model, where each country’s
structural shocks are assumed to comprise an unobserved component common to all coun-
tries and an unobserved country-specific component, which are orthogonal to each other by
construction. Formally, the jth block for j = 1, 2, 3 –with respect to the jth structural shock–
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of the measurement equation reads


εj
1,t
...
εj
7,t

 =


αj
10
...
αj
70

 ξ
j
0t +


ξj
1t
...
ξj
7t

 , (3)
where αji0 is the loading for the i
th country, corresponding to the common factor of the
jth structural shock, ξj
0t is the common factor for the j
th structural shock, and ξjit is the
country-specific component of the jth structural shock for the ith country. Hence, αji0ξ
j
0t gives
the common component of the jth structural shock for the ith country. Both unobservable
components are modeled as white noise errors due to the assumption of no autocorrelation
and no cross-correlation of the structural shocks and their zero-mean property.
The parameters of the system and the unobserved common components are estimated
via Maximum Likelihood and the Kalman filter. Since our state equations comprise only
white noise errors, the fixed-interval smoother and the one-step-ahead estimates of the states
coincide. Therefore, our inference about the system’s states does not depend on the chosen
smoothing algorithm of the Kalman filter recursion.
2.3. Model Dynamics
Finally, the estimated coefficients of the state-space model are fed back to the original
country-specific SVAR models, represented by (2):


∆yi,t
∆(Ri,t − pii,t)
∆pii,t

 = µi + Ci (L)


α1i0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 α2i0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 α3i0 1




ξ1
0t
ξ1it
ξ2
0t
ξ2it
ξ3
0t
ξ3it


. (4)
The representation in (4) allows us to compute the impulse response functions and historical
decompositions of the model variables with respect to each common and country-specific
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structural shock. Using (4) , a variable of the model, say x of country i at period t, can be
written as
xi,t = xi,t,ξ1
0
+ xi,t,ξ1i + xi,t,ξ20 + xi,t,ξ2i + xi,t,ξ30 + xi,t,ξ3i , (5)
where x
i,t,ξ
j
0
and x
i,t,ξ
j
i
are the values of xi,t if only the common or the country-specific
component of the jth shock had taken place at and before period t, respectively. This linear
decomposition allows us to compute the variance of xi,t as a sum of the covariances of its
sub-components with xi,t itself:
var (xi,t) = cov
(
xi,t, xi,t,ξ1
0
)
+ cov
(
xi,t, xi,t,ξ1i
)
+ · · ·+ cov
(
xi,t, xi,t,ξ3
0
)
. (6)
Since (6) is a statistical identity and holds exactly, cov
(
xi,t, xi,t,ξj
k
)
/var (xi,t) for k = 0, i
gives an estimate of the share of the sub-component with respect to the common or country-
specific structural shock j of xi,t in the total variance of xi,t.
4 We employ this type of a
variance decomposition in order to estimate the shares of the structural shocks over the
entire sample as well as over 6-year rolling windows below. The latter allows us to compute
the changing role of shocks throughout our sample period.
2.4. Theoretical Background
Many theoretical international business cycle models connect different economies through
exogenous processes. For instance, in a typical two-country model, both countries are as-
sumed to show a similar structure with different parameter values. The models considered by
Backus et al. (1992) and Baxter and Crucini (1993) provide a good example. The authors
assume that two economies are linked through technology, which is a part of the production
function and is modelled as an exogenous process:

 At
A∗t

 =

 ρA ρA∗
ρ∗A ρ
∗
A∗



 At−1
A∗t−1

+

 εt
ε∗t

 , (7)
4Note that negative “shares” cannot be ruled out a priori in practice. However, a negative share is
estimated rarely in this paper, and if at all, its absolute value is very small. Large negative shares would
imply that the structural shocks exhibit autocorrelation, i.e. the empirical model is not correctly specified,
since it is typically assumed that the structural shocks are not correlated contemporaneously as well as over
time, see Seymen (2008).
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where At and A
∗
t stand for the levels of technology in the home and foreign countries,
respectively, ρ and ρ∗ are the coefficients corresponding to the lag of the technology level
in the home and foreign countries, respectively, and εt and ε
∗
t are the technology shocks of
both countries with a non-zero covariance matrix. Note that other sources of shocks can be
easily added to (7). Technology shocks present one element of supply shocks, while other
supply phenomena, such as investment-specific technology shocks, depreciation shocks, etc.,
could also be considered. Demand shocks can be included in the form of preference shocks
affecting the consumption or leisure choices of households exogenously, or in the form of
shocks related to macroeconomic policy, such as tax shocks, government spending shocks,
etc. Finally, nominal shocks could be integrated analogously into a theoterical model that
includes money and prices. Our empirical model is assumed to reflect this type of structure in
a simple way, where the coefficients corresponding to the lagged level of exogenous processes
are embedded in the structural matrix polynomial Ci (L) in (2) and (4), and the correlation
between the structural shocks of the individual countries is due to the common component
as defined by (3).
3. Empirical Results
3.1. The Data
Analyses of international business cycles usually refer to the cyclical components of the
logarithms of real variables, such as output and consumption. In this study, we also consider
the nominal side of the economy by looking at the synchronisation of the inflation growth
and the nominal interest rate growth in the G7 group. The former variable is of interest in
the face of the recent ups and downs in inflation in the world, which is traced back mainly
to movements in the oil and commodity prices. Inflation is a relevant variable for monetary
policy in the G7 countries, and it is informative to assess the extent to which the quarterly
changes in inflation are due to international or country-specific factors. Regarding the latter
variable, the real interest rate is an important determinant of international capital flows,
and its level is to a large extent determined by the movements of the nominal interest rate.
Given that the interest rate is one of the crucial, if not the most crucial, monetary policy
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instruments, investigating the international co-movement properties of its changes is also
likely to give a clue as to the extent to which the policy-makers of the G7 countries take into
account international factors when setting the interest rates.
In our empirical analysis, we use quarterly data from the OECD Economic Outlook
Database. The measure of output is real GDP. The inflation rate is computed based on
the GDP deflator. The nominal interest rate is the short-term interest rate. The real
interest rate is computed as the difference between the nominal interest rate and the infla-
tion rate. Our data set spans the period from 1971:1–2007:4, including the initial values.
The cyclical component of output is computed using the asymmetric filter suggested by
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003), where the business cycle horizon is assumed to be in the
time period from 6 to 32 quarters. The cyclical measure for the inflation and the nominal
interest rate is the quarterly growth.
3.2. International Business Cycle Co-movement: Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 shows that output cycles of the G7 countries have been positively and highly
correlated over the entire sample period.5 Japanese output cycles have been in general less
related to other G7 countries’ cycles, excluding Germany. The existence of two cyclically
coherent groups –the euro area and the English-speaking countries– in terms of GDP cycles
as observed by Stock and Watson (2005) for GDP growth rates cannot be detected. Inflation
growth rates show much less coherence, if at all, as can be seen in the second panel of the
table.6 Whether these results are due to different shock propagation or asymmetric shocks
will be discussed below. Nominal interest rate growth –another high frequency variable– of
the G7 countries are moderately correlated, but the reported correlations are not as strong
as the correlations of the output cycles. Interesting also to note is that, as in the case of
output cycles, Japan differs from the other G7 countries to an important extent in terms of
5The sample period for the reported correlations in Table 1 covers the period from 1972:2–2007:4. Note
that we lose five observations when estimating our empirical model: one observation is lost due to first-
differencing the nonstationary variables and four observations are used as initial observations. Therefore,
we have discarded the observations from 1971:1–1972:1 when computing the correlations reported in Table
1 for the sake of comparibility with the results presented in the following sub-sections.
6This lack of coherence might be due to the high-frequency nature of growth rates. Therefore, we have
repeated our correlation computations with “inflation cycles” based on the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter as in
the case of output. The results, not reported here, were quite similar.
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nominal interest rate growth.
Figure 1, which shows the mean and standard deviation of correlations of the G7 coun-
tries’ cyclical fluctuations over a 6-year rolling window, is generally in line with the numbers
presented in Table 1: output cycles and nominal interest rate growth have historically also
always been more strongly correlated than the inflation growth in the G7 group. A com-
parison of the correlations of output cycles and nominal interest rate growth shows that the
average correlation of the latter variable was relatively low until the mid-1990s, while the
average output cycle correlation over a 6-year rolling window in the same period decreased
gradually. However, the average correlation started to increase by the mid-1990s for both
variables. This increase has nevertheless been reversed abruptly for the output cycles after
2005, whereas the average nominal interest rate growth correlation has continued increasing
up to this date. Although a slight increase can be observed on average for the mean correla-
tion of inflation growth after 1990 roughly, that correlation stayed still much lower than the
correlation of output cycles and nominal interest rate growth.
An increase in the average correlation over a 6-year rolling window alone can lead to
spurious conclusions regarding the changing dynamics of business cycle synchronisation.
Only when such an increase is accompanied by a decrease in the corresponding standard
deviation, one can surely talk of a stronger international business cycle synchronisation.
In this respect, it is interesting to observe that the increases (decreases) in the standard
deviation of output cycle correlation illustrated in Figure 1 consistently follow the decreases
(increases) in reported mean correlations. It is not possible to say according to these pictures
that either an increasing or decreasing business cycle synchronisation has occured in the
entire covered sample period. There are, however, episodes of high and low synchronisation.
We also establish that the dispersion of correlations of inflation growth and nominal interest
rate growth has not changed much through time, i.e., the reported standard deviation has
followed a rather stable path. Regarding the nominal interest rate growth, this observation
reflects a steady increase in synchronisation since the mid-1990s.
Our empirical model is constructed so that only common G7 shocks can lead to co-
movements of the G7 countries’ cycles. Accordingly, we are interested in two main questions
in the following. First, we will investigate which type of structural shock(s) can explain
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the relatively high and positive output cycle and nominal interest rate growth correlations.
Second, we will check the extent to which the lack of a strong co-movement in terms of
inflation growth has its roots in distinct shock propagation mechanisms or asymmetric shocks
across the G7 countries.
3.3. Specification of the Empirical Model
Since we are working with quarterly data and different information criteria point to
different lag orders for different countries, four lags of the endogenous variables have been
included in the VAR estimation of every country for the sake of comparability. Furthermore,
it has been assumed that output, real interest rate and inflation are integrated of order 1 in
every G7 country and exhibit no cointegration. Statistical tests of cointegration rank have
pointed to ambiguous results, depending on the model specification and country considered.
We have decided for no cointegration for all countries’ models, since this null hypothesis
could not be rejected in many cases, and in order to ensure the comparibility of our results.
Table 2 reports the estimated α coefficients of the common components of the structural
shocks –supply, demand and nominal– in (3). Almost all coefficients of the G7 countries
except Japan are significant at the 5-percent level. The coefficient for Italy corresponding to
the common supply shock and the coefficient for the US corresponding to the common nomi-
nal shock are significant at the 10-percent level. The estimated coefficients for Japan are low
in absolute value and differ significantly from the other G7 countries’ estimated coefficients.
Important is that all estimated coefficients are positive abstracting from the (insignificantly)
estimated coefficient corresponding to the common demand shocks for Japan. This is plau-
sible and implies that the dynamic response of a country to a unit common and a unit
country-specific structural shock follows the same direction.7
3.4. International Business Cycle Co-movement: Counterfactual Analysis
Tables 3a, 3b and 3c show the counterfactual correlations of output cycles and counter-
factual correlations of quarterly inflation growth and nominal interest rate growth of the G7
7A negative coefficient would, on the other hand, imply that the response of a country’s variables to a
unit, say, common supply and country-specific supply shock of the same type are mirror-inverted.
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countries that would have taken place if the G7 countries were subject to common shocks
only.8 The first three panels of the tables show the counterfactual correlations with respect
to common supply, demand and nominal shocks, respectively. The last panel reports the
counterfactual correlations if all three common shocks took place in the sample period. Note
that the common shocks are by construction the only driving force of international business
cycle co-movement in our empirical framework. A high positive counterfactual correlation
indicates that the transmission mechanisms of shocks in the related countries are similar. A
correlation coefficient close to zero would indicate completely different transmission mecha-
nisms, while a negative correlation coefficient would mean that the particular shock leads to
a divergence of the cycles of the countries.
The reported coefficients in Table 3a imply that the response of output cycles to supply
shocks is highly synchronised in the G7 countries, the lowest correlation coefficient being
observed between the cycles of Canada and Italy with a reading of 0.81.9 The transmission
mechanisms also show important similarities in the face of demand shocks, albeit to a lesser
extent than the transmission mechanisms of supply shocks. The relationships between Ger-
many and the rest of the G7 countries are in this respect rather an exception with relatively
weaker correlations. Finally, the output cycles would have usually also been rather highly
correlated if common nominal shocks occurred in the sample period only, but less strongly
than in the case of supply and demand shocks. France shows stark contrast in this respect
compared to the other G7 countries, displaying weak or negative correlations with them.
Common nominal shocks alone would have even led to a divergence between the output
cycles of France and the United Kingdom.
The counterfactual correlations reported for inflation growth in Table 3b are generally
weaker than the correlations reported for output cycles. Although a reason behind this
might be that inflation growth is high frequency data whereas output cycles refer to lower
frequencies, lower correlations are still obtained if a cyclical component is computed for
8Recall that the supply, demand and nominal shocks of Japan are insignificantly related to common G7
shocks as reported in Table 2. Therefore, we do not comment the correlations corresponding to Japan in the
following.
9Note that the strong correlation that would have occurred if only common supply shocks took place in
the past does not immediately imply that those shocks have played a major role for the co-movements. We
deal with the latter question with the aid of variance decompositions below.
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the inflation using the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter as for output (not reported here). The
transmission mechanisms of common supply shocks on inflation growth have been different
from country to country according to the reported correlations in Table 3b. Common demand
or nominal shocks alone would have led, however, to generally high positive correlations,
implying that the shock propagation mechanisms of the G7 countries are quite similar in
this respect.
Nominal interest rate growth counterfactual correlations reported in Table 3c point, as in
the case of output cycle counterfactual correlations, to similar dynamic response mechanisms
in the G7 countries. Germany’s nominal interest rate growth is here an exception, which
would have diverged from the nominal interest rate growth in the other countries, had only
common supply shocks occurred in the past.
Finally, it can be established by looking at the last panels of Tables 3a, 3b and 3c that,
abstracting from Japan, we would have observed very high correlations of the G7 countries’
cycles if all common shocks took place in past and country-specific shocks were absent.
3.5. Historical Variance Decomposition
3.5.1. Entire Sample
The counterfactual correlations of the previous sub-section show that rather high cor-
relations would generally have been observed between the cyclical fluctuations of the G7
countries if they were subject to common shocks only. However, the true correlations be-
tween the cycles are generated by common as well as country-specific shocks, whereby the
latter do not lead to any statistically significant correlation among the cycles by construction
of our empirical model. Therefore, it is interesting to look at the weight of common and
country-specific shocks in the fluctuations of the model variables. Obviously, if the common
shocks have only a minor share in the variance of the cycles, it is unlikely that the true
correlations of the cycles are high.
The reported shares in Table 4a show that in our sample period the variance of output
cycles is explained in every G7 country mainly by supply shocks. The share of supply shocks
has been particularly high in France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. Italy differs
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from the other euro-area countries in this respect, with its output cycles being also partly
attributable to nominal shocks like in Canada and the US. The US is the only country where
demand shocks have contributed, albeit weakly, to output fluctuations. The share of the
common component in output cycles is highest in France with 0.73, i.e., more than half of
the variance of output cycles was due to common shocks in this country in the sample period.
The output cycles of Germany and the United Kingdom were also driven to an important
extent by common shocks to the G7 countries with shares of 0.30 and 0.35, respectively.
However, these shocks played a smaller role in the cycles of the rest of the G7 countries.
The reported shares of shocks in Table 4b indicate that inflation dynamics are to a large
extent driven by country-specific factors. Japan is the most extreme example here, for which
the empirical model attributes the entire fluctuation in inflation growth to country-specific
shocks. Also, among the G7 countries, Japan’s supply shocks had the largest share (0.20)
in the fluctuations of inflation growth. Supply shocks had small effects in the other G7
countries’ inflation growth variance. Country-specific demand and nominal shocks had a
rather balanced share in the inflation growth fluctuations of the euro area countries and
Canada, while demand shocks were dominant in the United Kingdom with a share of 0.82
and nominal shocks were dominant in the US with a share of 0.81.
The variance of nominal interest rate growth can be attributed to a moderate extent to
common G7 shocks as in the case of output cycles, see Table 4c. The decomposition of the
variance with respect to the structural shocks, however, differs significantly from the output
cycle variance decomposition. Supply shocks have played a less important role in the variance
of nominal interest rate growth, which has in turn been negligible in France, Germany and
the UK. Demand shocks were the main determinant of the volatility in nominal interest rate
growth in Germany and the US, while the nominal shocks contributed the most to the same
volatility in Canada, France, Italy, Japan and the UK.
3.5.2. 6-Year Rolling Windows
An important methodological advantage of the historical variance decomposition tech-
nique employed for estimating the shares reported in Tables 4a, 4b and 4c is that it is
applicable also to sub-periods. Therefore, we can use the technique for computing the shares
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of structural G7 shocks in the cycles of the countries over 6-year rolling windows. To do this,
we first compute the realisations of cycles for each country with respect to each common
and country-specific structural shock for the whole sample period.10 Hence, we obtain six
sub-components (counterfactual components) of the cycles of each variable of each country
for the whole sample period. The sum of these six components gives the true cycle. We then
compute the variance of a country’s related cycle in the first 6-year window from 1972Q2
to 1978Q1. The covariance of each counterfactual sub-component with the (corresponding)
total cycle divided by the variance of the total cycle for the 6-year window gives then the
estimate of the share of the shock corresponding to the sub-component. Then, the same
computation is done for the second 6-year window from 1972Q3 to 1978Q2, etc.
Figure 2a illustrates the shares of common shocks in output fluctuations in the G7 coun-
tries. Common demand and nominal shocks have not played a considerable role in any of the
countries throughout the entire sample period. Only in Canada and Italy had common nom-
inal shocks a share of about 0.15 until the beginning of the 1990s. There have been, however,
episodes where common supply shocks were an important determinant of output cycles. In
particular, French output cycles have largely been driven by common supply shocks, the
effect of which has decreased recently. These shocks were also an important driving force of
output cycles until the early 1980s in Canada, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom has seen an important surge in the share of common supply shocks
after the mid-1990s, which has, however, disappeared within the short time period after
2005. Finally, common supply shocks have not been an important driving force of output
cycles in the US throughout the sample period.
The picture arising from Figure 2a does partly help to explain the dynamics of mean
correlations of the G7 output cycles presented in Figure 1. The decrease in the output cycle
mean correlations from the beginning of the sample period until the mid-1990s in Figure 1
arises clearly from the gradual decreases in the share of common supply shocks in Germany,
Japan and the United Kingdom observed in Figure 2a. Canada and the US have also shown
abrupt decreases in the same share in the same period, the former in the first half of the
10This is done exactly as in the case of computing the counterfactual correlations above. However, the
counterfactual correlations were computed with respect to common structural shocks only.
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1980s and the latter in the first half of the 1990s, which can also be roughly followed in Figure
1. Furthermore, the recent abrupt decrease in the mean correlations of the G7 countries’
output cycles can be traced back to the decrease in the share of common supply shocks in
the output cycle variance of France, Germany and the United Kingdom in particular, and,
to a lesser extent, Italy and Japan.
Figure 2b, which shows the shares of common shocks in the inflation growth of the G7
countries, is also in line with the above result that refers to the entire sample period: common
shocks had negligible effects in the past. The only exception in this respect is the surge in
the share of common demand shocks in the inflation growth variance after 2000 in the United
Kingdom, which, however, decreased again recently.
The role of common supply shocks in the nominal interest rate growth fluctuations has
generally been rather low as illustrated in Figure 2c. Common supply shocks can be at-
tributed an increasing share only in the fluctuations of France since about 2000. On the
other hand, common demand shocks have played a gradually increasing role in the volatility
of nominal interest rate growth of France, Germany and the US and recently became the
dominant source of the fluctuations of this variable in those countries. Finally, common nom-
inal shocks have a significant share in the nominal interest rate growth variance throughout
our sample period, which is also in line with the reported shares in Table 4c, but are not so
important for the same variance in the other G7 countries.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the properties of the G7 countries’ business cycle
dynamics, which are assumed to be driven by common supply, demand and nominal shocks.
We found that output cycles of the G7 countries have generally been highly correlated in
our entire sample as well as in shorter windows. Yet, a general increase in the business
cycle synchronisation could not be established, as some studies have suggested, due to the
factors such as increased trade, stronger financial market integration and other international
institutions, etc. Nominal interest rate growth, though a higher-frequency variable than
output cycle, was found to be also moderately correlated in the G7 group, for which a
gradual increase in international synchronisation since the mid-1990s could be observed.
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Inflation growth, on the other hand, is a rather country-specific phenomenon according to
our findings and has also been so in shorter windows in the past.
Our counterfactual analysis has pointed to the similarity of shock propagation mecha-
nisms in the G7 countries in many cases. That is, we would have observed much higher
correlations of the cyclical measures in our study, if only common shocks had occurred or
if common shocks had a larger share in the variance of the cycles/growth rates of the G7
countries. Japan is, however, an important exception in this respect. None of its estimated
country-specific structural shocks is significantly related to the common G7 component.
Furthermore, in line with this finding, the common G7 shocks contribute the least to the
variance of the Japanese cycle and growth rates among the G7 countries. The latter finding
has likely to do with the de-coupling of Japan from the other G7 economics after the 1990s.
This is evident in our estimated common-supply-shock shares in the output cycles of Japan
over 6-year rolling windows, which have been around zero since the second half of the 1990s.
Other studies confirm this conclusion, too. Stock and Watson (2005) write, for example,
that “during the 1980s and 1990s, the cyclical fluctuations in Japanese GDP became almost
detached from the other G7 economies, with domestic shocks explaining almost all of the
cyclical movements in Japanese GDP”. Their forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD)
analysis shows that 20 percent of output growth forecast error variance of Japan could be
attributed to G7 shocks in the sample 1960–1983, while that share decreased to 1 percent in
the sample 1984–2002 at a forecast horizon of 8 quarters. The findings of Perez et al. (2006),
who estimate US, EU15 and country-specific shocks for each G7 country, do also roughly
confirm this result.
The historical variance decomposition attributes 72 percent of the variance of France’s
output cycles to common supply shocks, which is by far the highest share observed among
the G7 countries. While this irregularity deserves to be scrutinised in the future, we would
like to note that it is not a finding peculiar to our study. The FEVD carried out by
Stock and Watson (2005) attributes shares as high as 87 and 88 percent to the G7 shocks
in the output growth forecast error variance of France at a forecast horizon of 8 quarters in
the samples from 1960–1983 and from 1984–2002, respectively. Crucini et al. (2008) also ob-
tain that G7 shocks have the highest share (80 percent) in output growth variance of France
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among the G7 countries. Finally, the country-specific shocks have only a limited share in the
output growth variance of France, while US and (even much more) EU15 shocks have large
weights in that variance according to the findings of Perez et al. (2006). Note that there
are important differences between our empirical approach and the empirical approach of the
aforementioned studies. For example, we do not measure spillover effects, or our model does
not include euro area shocks. Yet, the variance of French output cycles being determined
primarily by sources outside the economy seems to be a result common to all those studies.
Common nominal shocks contribute to the output cycle variance in Canada, Italy and the
US and common demand shocks in the US, albeit with a very small share, and the weights
of nominal and demand shocks were negligible for all other G7 countries according to our
findings. The total share of common shocks in the inflation growth variance could exceed
15 percent only in the case of Germany and the UK, with 18 and 15 percent, respectively,
which explains the low international correlation coefficients corresponding to this variable.
Obviously, the G7 countries do not differ much in terms of shock propagation with respect
to inflation growth, but they are subject to large asymmetric shocks. Finally, the total share
of common shocks is quite high in the G7 countries’ nominal interest rate growth, except
in Japan. Together with generally high-estimated counterfactual correlations, this finding
explains the strong correlation among the G7 countries’ nominal interest rate growth.
The empirical model we employ is in line with a class of theoretical international busi-
ness cycle models, which trace international linkages back to exogenous shocks. The main
advantage of our empirical approach vis-a`-vis other empirical approaches followed in the
related literature is that it enables us to classify common and country-specific shocks and
their dynamic effects on the economy from a structural point of view. In order to be able to
estimate structural common and country-specific shocks, we simplify our setting by assuming
that countries interact through exogenous shocks only. The current setting does not allow
us to deal with the impact of bilateral spillovers. The next step in our research agenda is to
deal with this issue.
Another challenge is to take the interdependencies of the endogenous variables into ac-
count. There are two main problems to deal with in this context. First, the number of
parameters to estimate explodes in VAR models including many countries. Second, the
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identification of structural shocks becomes a more difficult issue. Although a recent liter-
ature (initiated by Dees et al. (2007) among others) allows to model the world in a global
vector autoregression (GVAR) framework in a convenient way, the structural identification
in this framework still poses a challenge for macroeconometricians. The research in this area
could be another natural extension of our paper.
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Table 1: Correlation among cyclical components of the variables across countries
Output cycle
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.44 1.00
ger 0.32 0.52 1.00
ita 0.57 0.73 0.58 1.00
jap 0.12 0.37 0.59 0.33 1.00
uk 0.45 0.65 0.43 0.41 0.39 1.00
us 0.61 0.41 0.54 0.30 0.32 0.55 1.00
Inflation growth
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra -0.19 1.00
ger -0.06 0.03 1.00
ita 0.19 -0.08 0.25 1.00
jap -0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.09 1.00
uk -0.07 0.30 0.11 -0.08 -0.06 1.00
us 0.28 -0.08 0.13 0.03 -0.07 0.06 1.00
Nominal interest rate growth
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.43 1.00
ger 0.45 0.45 1.00
ita 0.27 0.41 0.18 1.00
jap 0.04 0.30 0.17 0.07 1.00
uk 0.24 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.37 1.00
us 0.69 0.36 0.35 0.29 -0.08 0.20 1.00
Notes: The cyclical component of output is computed using the filter suggested by Christiano
and Fitzgerald (2003), where the business cycle horizon is assumed to be in the time period
from 6 to 32 quarters. The cyclical measure for the inflation and the nominal interest rate is
the quarterly growth. The sample period is from 1972:2–2007:4, see the text.
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Table 2: Estimated α coefficients
can fra ger ita jap uk us
supply 0.58 1.71 1.13 0.49 0.41 0.92 0.68
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.15) (0.00) (0.01)
demand 0.75 0.89 1.19 0.71 -0.41 0.96 1.55
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00)
nominal 0.82 0.84 0.79 1.25 0.33 1.49 0.49
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.07)
Notes: p-values in parantheses. α coefficients refer to the coefficients for the individual countries
that correspond to the common components of the structural shocks –supply, demand and
nominal– in (3).
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Table 3a: Counterfactual correlations of output cycles of G7 countries with respect to the
common component of structural shocks
Supply
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.93 1.00
ger 0.84 0.97 1.00
ita 0.81 0.96 0.97 1.00
jap 0.97 0.99 0.94 0.92 1.00
uk 0.92 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.99 1.00
us 0.98 0.99 0.93 0.90 1.00 0.98 1.00
Demand
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.96 1.00
ger 0.45 0.64 1.00
ita 0.91 0.88 0.26 1.00
jap 0.90 0.94 0.77 0.70 1.00
uk 0.92 0.99 0.72 0.85 0.94 1.00
us 0.99 0.99 0.54 0.90 0.93 0.96 1.00
Nominal
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.07 1.00
ger 0.93 -0.15 1.00
ita 0.86 -0.11 0.81 1.00
jap 0.71 -0.47 0.81 0.90 1.00
uk 0.78 -0.54 0.85 0.85 0.94 1.00
us 0.98 0.27 0.86 0.78 0.57 0.64 1.00
All
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.90 1.00
ger 0.86 0.97 1.00
ita 0.83 0.89 0.92 1.00
jap 0.94 0.99 0.96 0.89 1.00
uk 0.91 0.97 0.98 0.93 0.98 1.00
us 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 1.00
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Table 3b: Counterfactual correlations of inflation growth of G7 countries with respect to the
common component of structural shocks
Supply
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.06 1.00
ger 0.44 -0.22 1.00
ita 0.04 -0.10 0.43 1.00
jap 0.03 -0.18 -0.05 -0.37 1.00
uk 0.39 -0.25 0.77 0.11 0.57 1.00
us -0.28 -0.45 0.31 -0.03 0.74 0.68 1.00
Demand
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.92 1.00
ger 0.82 0.68 1.00
ita 0.86 0.82 0.85 1.00
jap -0.79 -0.75 -0.79 -0.92 1.00
uk 0.97 0.87 0.86 0.90 -0.90 1.00
us 0.67 0.56 0.77 0.61 -0.78 0.77 1.00
Nominal
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.99 1.00
ger 0.80 0.83 1.00
ita 0.97 0.97 0.91 1.00
jap 0.74 0.69 0.35 0.64 1.00
uk 0.67 0.65 0.35 0.63 0.83 1.00
us 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.60 0.63 1.00
All
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.82 1.00
ger 0.76 0.59 1.00
ita 0.87 0.81 0.80 1.00
jap -0.21 -0.12 -0.18 -0.18 1.00
uk 0.75 0.50 0.63 0.61 -0.19 1.00
us 0.68 0.55 0.76 0.71 0.03 0.62 1.00
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Table 3c: Counterfactual correlations of nominal interest rate growth of G7 countries with
respect to the common component of structural shocks
Supply
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.40 1.00
ger -0.23 0.59 1.00
ita 0.80 0.65 0.06 1.00
jap 0.74 0.02 -0.55 0.35 1.00
uk 0.73 0.64 -0.09 0.88 0.42 1.00
us 0.87 0.06 -0.32 0.57 0.63 0.49 1.00
Demand
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.98 1.00
ger 0.88 0.95 1.00
ita 0.96 0.97 0.91 1.00
jap -0.96 -0.98 -0.91 -0.95 1.00
uk 0.76 0.84 0.94 0.79 -0.84 1.00
us 0.94 0.93 0.80 0.89 -0.95 0.74 1.00
Nominal
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.97 1.00
ger 0.97 0.91 1.00
ita 0.99 0.97 0.95 1.00
jap 0.95 0.88 0.95 0.91 1.00
uk 0.97 0.99 0.91 0.98 0.88 1.00
us 0.85 0.73 0.87 0.76 0.89 0.74 1.00
All
can fra ger ita jap uk us
can 1.00
fra 0.87 1.00
ger 0.79 0.88 1.00
ita 0.92 0.87 0.77 1.00
jap 0.41 0.13 -0.10 0.38 1.00
uk 0.90 0.86 0.73 0.98 0.42 1.00
us 0.70 0.66 0.74 0.51 -0.18 0.46 1.00
25
Table 4a: Shares of shocks in output fluctuations of G7 countries
Common
supply demand nominal total
can 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.21
fra 0.72 0.01 0.00 0.73
ger 0.27 0.01 0.02 0.30
ita 0.13 0.00 0.10 0.23
jap 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.14
uk 0.29 0.00 0.05 0.35
us 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.20
Total
supply demand nominal
0.71 0.02 0.26
0.97 0.03 -0.00
0.90 0.03 0.06
0.81 0.01 0.19
0.96 0.01 0.03
0.92 0.00 0.08
0.67 0.13 0.20
Table 4b: Shares of shocks in inflation growth of G7 countries
Common
supply demand nominal total
can 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05
fra 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.11
ger 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.18
ita 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.13
jap -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
uk 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.15
us -0.00 0.05 0.05 0.10
Total
supply demand nominal
0.02 0.64 0.33
0.05 0.44 0.51
0.09 0.44 0.47
0.03 0.66 0.31
0.20 0.55 0.25
0.11 0.82 0.07
0.09 0.10 0.81
Table 4c: Shares of shocks in nominal interest rate growth of G7 countries
Common
supply demand nominal total
can 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.18
fra 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.26
ger 0.03 0.19 0.08 0.31
ita 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.27
jap 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.05
uk 0.04 0.02 0.34 0.40
us 0.01 0.31 0.02 0.33
Total
supply demand nominal
0.26 0.20 0.54
0.08 0.40 0.52
0.08 0.56 0.36
0.24 0.04 0.71
0.20 0.22 0.58
0.14 0.05 0.81
0.18 0.67 0.15
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Figure 1: Mean and standard deviation of correlations of output cycles, and inflation and
nominal interest rate growth among the G7 countries over a 6-year rolling window
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Figure 2a: Shares of common components of shocks in output cycle variance of G7 countries over a 6-year rolling window
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Figure 2b: Shares of common components of shocks in inflation growth variance of G7 countries over a 6-year rolling window
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Figure 2c: Shares of common components of shocks in nominal interest rate growth variance of G7 countries over a 6-year
rolling window
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